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Abstract
The rewrite-based approach provides executable speciﬁcations for security policies, which can be indepen-
dently designed, veriﬁed, and then anchored on programs using a modular discipline. In this paper, we
describe how to perform queries over these rule-based policies in order to increase the trust of the policy
author on the correct behavior of the policy. The analysis we provide is founded on the strategic narrowing
process, which provides both the necessary abstraction for simulating executions of the policy over access
requests and the mechanism for solving what-if queries from the security administrator. We illustrate this
general approach by the analysis of a ﬁrewall system policy.
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1 Introduction
Security policies deﬁne what it means to be secure for a system. Policies establish
constraints on how data are to be accessed, either by determining acceptable in-
formation ﬂows, or by describing the privileges principals have over the protected
resources inside the system. Since policies reﬂect the security requirements for
some organization, or generally speaking, for some entity, they are subject to fre-
quent changes as new threats appear or as the architecture of the system in question
evolves. One of the current challenges in computer security is to model rich, ex-
pressive policies, usually given as a set of rules, such that their properties can be
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formally stated and proved. For instance, policies should be non-ambiguous, which
means that an access is not granted and denied at the same time. Policies should
also cover all relevant situations a system may be exposed to: when dealing with
access control, this means answering all possible access requests.
In [14,10] we proposed a formal model of policies, based on term rewriting, which
provides several advantages: ﬁrst, the language allows us to handle a wide range of
security policies, because we can easily describe the form of the access requests and
the set of possible authorization decisions, without restricting them to simply permit
or deny. Moreover, policy application can be deﬁned in a precise and expressive
way, since it is possible to determine a strategy to control rule application.
Such an approach provides not only a clear semantics to access control policies,
but also appropriate techniques to verify important properties, relying on the con-
ﬂuence, termination and suﬃcient completeness of the underlying rewrite systems.
Moreover, the rewrite-based framework inherits from the modularity results for all
these properties, which is a striking advantage over other frameworks, since one
can reason about the impact of the policy composition over the properties of the
component policies.
Besides proving these properties, a policy designer needs to understand how
access decisions are generated. He may want to know how a policy deals with speciﬁc
kinds of requests, specially those concerning the most sensitive information in the
system. In the literature, this is often referred to as “administrator queries” [27,7],
representing questions of the kind “what if a request is made under these conditions?
Will access be conceded?” Answering these questions increases the conﬁdence of
the policy designer in a given speciﬁcation.
In this paper, we build on our previous works to provide this kind of analysis
for rewrite-based policies. The main mechanism behind the analysis is narrowing,
which provides both the necessary abstraction for simulation of rewriting-based
executions of the policy requests and the solving mechanism of queries. We extend
the policy language with requests involving variables and we show how narrowing
can be used to ﬁnd which values can instantiate such variables in order to satisfy
given requests, thus providing an adequate mechanism for solving these queries.
Due to the expressiveness and computational power of rewriting, the framework
of rewrite-based security policies is general enough to be applied to a large variety
of security problems. An illustrative example is provided by ﬁrewall policies. A
ﬁrewall is a security component put in the entry point of a local network to control
its interactions with the Internet. The main objective is to inspect the packet
traﬃc from and into the local network and to decide whether a given packet should
be transmitted or rejected. Real ﬁrewall implementations are usually given as a
sequence (i.e. totally ordered set) of rules, which can make recursive calls, and may
have default rules. This is the case for instance for NetFilter, which is the ﬁrewall
system used in several variations of Linux distributions. It is important to notice
that such a rule presentation is used as a description of the rule execution sequence.
This is indeed an implicit rule execution strategy implemented by these systems,
and the capacity of expressing such strategies explicitly is primordial to make the
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policy semantics clear, maintainable and provable. In current systems, security
administrators often face the problem of avoiding an inconsistent, redundant or
incomplete set of rules as described for example in [24].
Here, we show how solving queries can be useful to identify such situations for
this extremely important kind of policy, since they are the most current mechanism
for protecting networks from numerous threats. But the technique is also applicable
for any other form of ﬂexible rewrite-based policy.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we recall and illustrate the
deﬁnition of a rewrite-based security policy. In Section 3, the relevant deﬁnitions
of rewriting, narrowing and strategies are given. It stresses the notion of strategic
rewriting which is of prime interest in the context of policy rules where the appli-
cation order and more generally the control are taken into account. Then Section 4
shows how to use strategic narrowing to solve queries and ﬁnd the corresponding
requests in a large class of policy speciﬁcations. It provides examples of what-if
analysis. To support the reader intuition, a simpliﬁed ﬁrewall example is developed
along the paper. Section 5 concludes with some perspectives for further work.
2 Rewrite-Based Policies
Basic deﬁnitions on term rewriting can be found in [29,31,4]. The following standard
notations will be used in the following. T (F ,X ) is the set of ﬁrst-order terms built
from a given ﬁnite set F of function symbols with their proﬁle declarations and a
denumerable set X of variables. Positions in a term are represented as sequences
of integers and denoted by ω, while the empty sequence  denotes the top position.
They are ordered by lexicographic preﬁx ordering ≤. The notation t|ω is used to
denote the subterm of t at position ω. We write t[s]ω (or sometimes simply t[s])
to emphasize that t contains the subterm s at position ω. The set of variables
occurring in a term t is denoted by Var(t). If Var(t) is empty, t is called a ground
term and T (F) is the set of ground terms.
A substitution σ is an assignment from X to T (F ,X ), with a ﬁnite domain
{x1, . . . , xk} and written σ = {x1 → t1, . . . , xk → tk}. The set of variables
{x1, . . . , xn} is called its domain and denoted D(σ). The set ∪i=1,...,n Var(ti) is
denoted I(σ). We write σ|V the restriction of σ to the set of variables V , and
σ = σ′[V ] means that ∀x ∈ V, σ(x) = σ′(x).
A rewrite rule is an ordered pair of terms l, r ∈ T (F ,X ), denoted l→r, where
it is often required that l is not a variable and Var(r) ⊆ Var(l). The terms l and
r are respectively called the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the rule. A
rewrite system is a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) set of rewrite rules. Rules can be labeled to
easily talk about them.
In [14], we introduced a general deﬁnition of an access control policy that ab-
stracts the set of possible requests and decisions, and thus supports a wide range of
policies:
Deﬁnition 2.1 [Security Policy [14]] An access control security policy ℘ is a 5-tuple
(F , D,R,Q, ζ) where:
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(i) F is a sorted signature; to deﬁne the vocabulary of the data-structure.
(ii) D is a non-empty set of closed terms: D ⊆ T (F); to formalize the set of
decisions taken by the policy.
(iii) R is a set of rewrite rules over T (F ,X ); to provide the local semantics of the
policy.
(iv) Q is a set of terms from T (F): Q ⊆ T (F); to describe the form of the acceptable
requests.
(v) ζ is a rewrite strategy for R; to guide the rule application and therefore provide
the global semantics of the policy.
The notions of local and global semantics mentioned in the comments of this deﬁ-
nition are provided as an intuitive way to describe the fact that a rewrite rule is an
entity that describes a local transformation and a strategy a way to combine these
local application rules. This is formally developed in the next section (section 3).
In order to illustrate this deﬁnition, let us consider the following simple example.
Example 2.2 This example is taken from the NetFilter how-to 2 . Suppose an
Internet user wants to set his ﬁrewall to block any traﬃc coming from the exterior
to his local network. Since the interface associated to Internet connections is usually
ppp0, a simple method is to reject all new packets coming from this source. In order
to demonstrate the fact that it might be convenient for a policy to contain rules
beyond those which directly compute decisions, we also give some additional rules
which allow two diﬀerent local computers to share the same external IP address:
for each outgoing packet whose origin is a local machine, its head is rewritten to a
single address.
• The sorted signature F for this policy is:
pckt : Address×Address× State → Decision
new, estab : → State
drop, accept : → Decision
eth0, ppp0, 10.1.1.1,
10.1.1.2, 123.123.1.1 : → Address
The function pckt computes a decision for the packets being transmitted in the
network.
• The set of of constant symbols representing decisions is D = {accept, drop}.
• Consider R as the following rules, where src, dst : Address, and s : State are
2 http://www.netfilter.org
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variables:
pckt(src, dst, estab) → accept
pckt(eth0, dst, new) → accept
pckt(ppp0, dst, new) → drop
pckt(10.1.1.1, ppp0, s) → pckt(123.123.1.1, ppp0, s)
pckt(10.1.1.2, ppp0, s) → pckt(123.123.1.1, ppp0, s)
The ﬁrst rule says that packets concerning established connections have to be
accepted. The second rule matches any packet whose origin is the local network,
which are accepted. The third rule rejects any new packet coming from the exter-
nal network (ppp0). The last two rules match the IP address of the local machines
and rewrites them to a single IP address visible from the external network.
• The set Q consists in all ground terms having the symbol pckt at top position.
• A common strategy for such ﬁrewall policy, is to apply rules in the order they are
given. We will see how to formalize this strategy in the following section.
The above elements deﬁne a security policy. It is worth noticing the presence of
recursive rules, which are important for the policy deﬁnition, but that do not directly
derive permissions.
Further examples to illustrate this deﬁnition are given for instance in [14,10,12].
In this framework, policy evaluation corresponds to evaluation by strategic rewriting
of ground requests. Let us introduce this concept in the next section.
3 Strategic rewriting and narrowing
Strategic rewriting and narrowing are deﬁned and studied in [28]; the interested
reader can refer to it for more details.
Given a rewrite system R, a term t in T (F ,X ) rewrites to another term t′ if
there exists a rewrite rule l→r of R, a position ω in t, and a substitution σ such
that t|ω = σl and t′ = t[σr]ω. This is written t→Rω,l→r,σt′ where either ω, l→r, σ
or R may be omitted. t|ω is called a redex. A term that has no redex is said to be
irreducible for R or to be in R-normal form, or simply normalized. The reﬂexive
transitive closure of the rewriting relation induced by R is denoted by ∗→R.
A term rewrite system R generates an abstract reduction system, i.e. a labeled
oriented graph R = (OR,SR) whose nodes are terms OR ⊆ T (F ,X ), and whose
oriented edges are rewriting steps: SR = {t→t′|t→Rω t′ for ω a position in t}. An
R-derivation or R-reduction sequence is a path π in the graph R; when it is ﬁnite,
π can be written t0→φ0t1→φ1t2 . . .→φn−1tn where the φi are labels, and we say
that t0 reduces to tn by the derivation π = φ0φ1 . . . φn−1; this is also denoted
t0→φ0φ1...φn−1tn or simply t0→πtn; n is the length of π. A derivation is empty
when its length is zero, in which case its source and target are the same. The
empty derivation issued from t is denoted idt. The source of π is the singleton {t0}
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denoted dom(π). The target of π is the singleton {tn} and it is denoted (π t0) or
simply πt0 when there is no syntactic ambiguity; note that an R-derivation is the
concatenation of its reduction steps. The concatenation of π1 and π2 when it exists,
is a new R-derivation.
It is common to identify a rewrite system (i.e., a set of rewrite rules) with the
abstract reduction system it generates (i.e., the set of all derivations allowed by R).
To a rewrite system corresponds directly a unique abstract reduction system that
can be seen as a generic way to describe the set of all derivations. The converse
is not true since from a set of derivations, the generating rewrite system is not in
general uniquely determined.
3.1 Strategic Rewriting
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Abstract Strategy] For a given abstract reduction system R:
An abstract strategy ζ is a subset of the set of all derivations (ﬁnite or not) of R.
Applying the strategy ζ on an object t is denoted ζt. It denotes the set of all objects
that can be reached from t using a derivation in ζ:
ζt = {t′ | ∃π ∈ ζ such that t→πt′} = {πt | π ∈ ζ}.
When no derivation in ζ has source t, we say that the strategy application on t
fails. Applying the strategy ζ on a set of objects consists in applying ζ to each
element t of the set. The result is the union of ζt for all t in the set of objects.
The domain of a strategy is the set of objects that are source of a derivation in
ζ: dom(ζ) =
⋃
δ∈ζ dom(δ). The strategy that contains all the empty derivations is
Id = {idt | t ∈ O}.
It is now possible to give the deﬁnition of strategic rewriting:
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Strategic rewriting [28]] Let R = (OR,SR) be the abstract reduc-
tion system generated by a rewrite system R and ζ be a strategy of R. A strategic
rewriting derivation (or rewriting derivation under strategy ζ) is an element of ζ. A
strategic rewriting step under ζ is a rewriting step t→Rt′ that occurs in a derivation
of ζ, which is denoted t→ζt′.
A strategy can be described by enumerating all its elements or more suitably
by a strategy language. Various approaches have been followed, yielding slightly
diﬀerent strategy languages such as ELAN [30,8], Stratego [36], Tom [6,5] 3 or more
recently Maude [9]. All these languages share the concern to provide abstract ways
to express control of rule applications, by using reﬂexivity and the meta-level for
Maude, or the notion of rewriting strategies for ELAN or Stratego. Strategies such as
bottom-up, top-down or leftmost-innermost are higher-order features that describe
how rewrite rules should be applied. Tom, ELAN and Stratego provide ﬂexible and
expressive strategy languages where high-level strategies are deﬁned by combining
low level primitives. We refer to [28] for more details on these strategy languages.
3 http://tom.loria.fr
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In the context of security policies that we want to consider here, a few strategies
are of main interest: the strategy universal(R) represents all derivations generated
by a set of rewrite rules R, innermost(R) represents derivations where rules of R are
applied only on terms whose all strict subterms are irreducible. ordered(r1, ..., rk)
represents derivations where rules r1, ..., rk are tried in this order on terms whose all
strict subterms are irreducible. This last strategy corresponds to Innermost Priority
rewriting (IP-rewriting for short) that is deﬁned below.
When a rewrite system R is partially ordered with an ordering 
, we say that
r1 has a higher priority than r2 if r1 is greater than r2, denoted r1 
 r2. Innermost
Priority Rewriting can then be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Innermost Priority Rewriting [21]] Given a rewrite system R with
a partial ordering on rules, a term t in T (F ,X ) IP-rewrites to t′, if there exists a
rewrite rule l→r of R, a position ω in t, and a substitution σ such that t|ω = σl
and t′ = t[σr]ω such that t→Rω,l→r,σt′, no proper subterm of t|ω is IP-reducible, and
t|ω is not reducible by any other rule of higher priority than l→r. This is written
t→IPω,l→r,σt′ where either ω, l→r, σ or R may be omitted. t|ω is called a IP-redex.
A term that has no IP-redex is said to be IP-normalized.
With this deﬁnition, we get:
Proposition 3.4 A term t is IP-normalized iﬀ it is normalized.
Proof If t is normalized, t is indeed IP-normalized. Let us prove the converse
by contraposition. If t is not in normal form, there exist an innermost position
and a non empty set of rules that apply at this position. By choosing a rule with
the higher-priority between them, we get an IP-rewriting step and t is not IP-
normalized. 
A substitution is said (ground) IP-normalized if all the terms in its image are
(ground) IP-normalized. According to Proposition 3.4, we may simply consider
normalized substitutions.
3.2 The narrowing process
The narrowing process, introduced in [26,16], is quite similar to rewriting but there,
matching is replaced by uniﬁcation. Let us recall its usual deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3.5 [Narrowing] Given a rewrite system R, a term t in T (F ,X ) narrows
to the term t′ if there exists a rewrite rule l→r of R and a position ω in t and such
that t|ω and l are uniﬁable with a most general uniﬁer (mgu for short) σ. Then
t′ = σ(t[r]ω). This is denoted tRω,l→r,σ t
′ or t t′ when we do not need to make
precise which rewrite rule is used and where.
Let us remember that the variables in a rewrite rule are implicitly universally
quantiﬁed and therefore, the set of variables in a rewrite rule may always be assumed
distinct from those in the narrowed term (i.e. in the deﬁnition above, Var(t) ∩
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Var(l) = ∅). Let us remark also that narrowing subsumes rewriting since a match
between variable disjoint terms is also a uniﬁer.
Based now on the narrowing process, a term rewrite system R generates another
abstract reduction system N = (OR,SR) with OR ⊆ T (F ,X ), and SR = {t 
t′|t Rω,l→r t′ for ω a position in t}. As for the rewriting relation, we can deﬁne
strategic narrowing.
Deﬁnition 3.6 [Strategic narrowing [28]] Given an abstract reduction system N =
(OR,SR) generated by a rewrite system R, and a strategy ζ of N , a strategic
narrowing derivation (or narrowing derivation under strategy ζ) is an element of ζ.
A strategic narrowing step under ζ is a narrowing step t R t′ that occurs in a
derivation of ζ, which is denoted tζ t′.
3.3 Simulation of rewriting by narrowing
We are now interested in formalizing precisely how (strategic) rewriting and (strate-
gic) narrowing are related. It may be expressed thanks to the general notion of
simulation on abstract reduction systems given in [22] and [15] independently.
Deﬁnition 3.7 [Simulation] Let (O1,→1) and (O2,→2) be two abstract reduction
systems. (O1,→1) Γ-simulates (O2,→2) for a relation Γ ⊆ O1 ×O2 when for every
reduction step s2 →2 s′2 with source s2 and target s′2, there exists a corresponding
reduction step t1 →1 t′1 with source t1 and target t′1, such that t1Γs2 and t′1Γs′2.
Let us deﬁne the relation Γ ⊆ T (F)×T (F ,Y) as : tΓu if t is a ground instance
of u. The following lemma entails the fact that the abstract reduction system
(T (F),→) simulates the abstract reduction system (T (F ,Y),).
Lemma 3.8 For any term t ∈ T (F ,Y) and rewrite system R, if tω,l→r,σ t′ then
σ(t)→ω,l→r,σt′, and for any ground instance α of σ, α(t)→ω,l→r,σα(t′).
Proof Clearly, if t ω,l→r,σ t′ then σ(t)→ω,l→r,σt′. Since α is an instance of σ,
α = μσ. Then α(t) = μ(σ(t))→ω,l→rμ(t′). But t′ = σ(t[r]ω), so μ(t′) = μσ(t[r]ω) =
α(t′). 
As a consequence, a derivation in the abstract reduction system (T (F ,Y),)
corresponds to a set of derivations in the abstract reduction system (T (F),→):
Proposition 3.9 For any term t ∈ T (F ,Y) and rewrite system R,
if tRω1,l1→r1,σ1 t1 . . .
R
ωn,ln→rn,σn tn, then
σn . . . σ1(t)→Rω1,l1→r1 . . .→Rωn,ln→rntn
and for any ground instance α of σn . . . σ1(t),
α(t)→Rω1,l1→r1 . . .→Rωn,ln→rnα(tn).
Given a terminating rewrite system R, let us consider N , the subset of normal-
ized ground instances of terms in T (F ,X ). The relation ΓN ⊆ T (F ,Y) × N is
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deﬁned as : uΓN t if t is a normalized ground instance of u. The fact that the ab-
stract reduction system (T (F ,Y),) ΓN -simulates the abstract reduction system
(N ,→) is a little more subtle to establish and is a consequence of the following
lemma proved ﬁrst by J.-M. Hullot [26].
Lemma 3.10 Let t0 be a term and ρ be a normalized substitution. If ρ(t0)→Rω,l→rt′1,
then there exist substitutions σ and μ such that:
(i) t0 Rω,l→r,σ t1,
(ii) μ(t1) = t′1, μ is normalized,
(iii) ρ =Var(t0) μσ (i.e. ∀x ∈ Var(t0), ρ(x) = μσ(x)).
This result is easily extended by induction on the number of steps to any rewrit-
ing derivation:
Proposition 3.11 Let t0 be a term and ρ be a normalized substitution such that:
ρ(t0)→Rω1,l1→r1 . . .→Rωn,ln→rnt′n.
Then there exist substitutions σi(i = 1, . . . , n) and μ such that:
(i) t0 Rω1,l1→r1,σ1 t1 . . .
R
ωn,ln→rn,σn tn,
(ii) μ(tn) = t′n, μ is normalized,
(iii) ρ =Var(t0) μσn . . . σ1 (i.e. ∀x ∈ Var(t0), ρ(x) = μσn . . . σ1(x)).
Narrowing derivations thus ΓN -simulates rewriting derivations when strategies
are not taken into account. In the more general case of strategic rewriting and
narrowing, simulation results have only been stated for speciﬁc strategies such as
innermost or outermost rewriting [22], and we address this problem here for priority
rewriting [21].
Completeness of the narrowing process for solving equational goals has been
largely studied in the litterature. A summary of results can be found in [1]. Ter-
mination of narrowing while preserving completeness has been less studied. Again
a state of the art can be found in [1], as well as the deﬁnition of several classes
of rewrite systems where narrowing has a ﬁnite search space, without requiring
conﬂuence of the rewrite system.
3.4 Simulation of IP-rewriting by IP-narrowing
Let us focus in this section on innermost priority rewriting and on the corresponding
strategic narrowing relation. The idea is to capture any IP-rewriting α(t)→IP s by
a constrained narrowing step (t, c)IP (t′, c′) by setting adequately the constraints
c, c′. For all normalized ground substitution α satisfying c′ (and c), we should get
an IP rewriting step on α(t) and a resulting term α(t′). Constraints are ﬁrst-order
equational formulas, and the trivial constraint, always true, is denoted id.
Let us now analyze the construction of these constraints. In order to make
possible the application of a rule l→r at some position ω in t, we ﬁrst need to ﬁnd
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a mgu of t|ω and l, say σ. Then to be IP-reducible by the rule l→r at position ω, a
ground normalized instance α(t) must satisfy the following conditions:
• α is an instance of σ. Note that we can also consider a narrowing substitution
σ of a term t at position ω with a rule l→r, as the solved form of an equational
constraint t|ω=?l; in the following, we also denote by σ this solved form. Then α
satisﬁes σ iﬀ α is an instance of σ of the form α = μσ[Var(t) ∪ Var(l)].
• There is no possible IP-rewriting at a position ω′ suﬃx of ω (written ω′ ≥ ω):
∀ω′ ≥ ω, ∀l′→r′ ∈ R,∀γ, α(t)|ω′ = γ(l′).
Since α is normalized, ω′ is a non-variable position in t. In other words α must
satisfy a constraint cinn which is a conjunction on all possible ω′ and l′ of dise-
quality constraints:
cinn =
∧
ω′≥ω
∧
l′→r′∈R
∀Var(l′), t|ω′ = l′.
• There is no rule of higher priority to apply at position ω:
∀l′→r′ 
 l→r ∈ R,∀γ, α(t)|ω = γ(l′).
In other words α must satisfy a constraint cprio which is a conjunction on all
possible l′ of disequality constraints:
cprio =
∧
l′→r′l→r∈R
∀Var(l′), t|ω = l′.
A few renaming conditions are imposed in this narrowing process involving σ
and l:
• variables of rules are kept disjoint from the variables of terms: Var(t)∪Var(σ(t))
and Var(l) are always disjoint sets;
• variables introduced by a mgu σ, that is I(σ), are disjoint from D(σ). This
condition implies that uniﬁers are idempotent (σσ = σ), so σ(t′) = σ(σ(t[r]ω)) =
t′;
We will need the three following lemmas, borrowed or adapted from [34].
Lemma 3.12 If t is a term and σ a substitution, then Var(σ(t)) = Var(t)\D(σ)∪
I(σ)| Var(t).
It is useful to notive that, with the previous hypotheses, free variables of the
constraints cinn and cprio belong to Var(t). As a consequence of Lemma 3.12, if σ is
the uniﬁer used in the narrowing step, σ(cinn) =
∧
ω′≥ω
∧
l′→r′inR ∀Var(l′), σ(t)|ω′ =
l′ and σ(cprio) =
∧
l′→r′l→r∈R ∀Var(l′), σ(t)|ω = l′ have free variables in Var(t) \
D(σ) ∪ I(σ)| Var(t).
Lemma 3.13 Suppose we have substitutions σ, θ, θ′ and sets A, B of variables
such that (B \D(σ)) ∪ I(σ) ⊆ A. If θ = θ′[A] then θσ = θ′σ[B].
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Lemma 3.14 Let R be a rewrite system with priorities and suppose we have sub-
stitutions σ, θ, θ′ and sets A, B of variables such that
• θ|A is normalized
• θ′σ = θ[A]
• B ⊆ A \D(σ)) ∪ I(σ)|A.
Then θ′|B is also normalized.
IP-narrowing is then deﬁned on constrained terms, i.e. pairs (t, c) of terms and
ﬁrst-order equational constraints.
Deﬁnition 3.15 [Constrained IP-narrowing] Let t be a term and c a constraint.
A constrained IP-narrowing step on (t, c) is deﬁned if there exist a rule l→r of the
system R, a non-variable position ω in t, a substitution σ solution of the constraint
t|ω=?l and a constraint cIP = cinn ∧ cprio such that σ ∧ c ∧ cIP is satisﬁable. Then
t′ = σ(t[r]ω) and c′ = σ(c) ∧ σ(cIP ). This is denoted by (t, c)IPω,l→r,σ (t′, c′).
A IP-narrowing derivation starting from (t0, c0) is a sequence of constrained
IP-narrowing steps.
Taking into account the restrictions put by constraints, we get the following
result.
Lemma 3.16 For any term t ∈ T (F ,Y) and rewrite system R with priorities, if
(t, c) IPω,l→r,σ (t
′, c′) then for any ground normalized instance of σ, α = μσ such
that μ satisﬁes c′, α(t)→IPω,l→rα(t′).
Proof Let us consider the term s = α(t). Its subterm s|ω is an instance of l and ω
is a position in t since α is normalized. Since α is an instance of σ, σ(t)→Rω,l→rt′ and
α(t) = μ(σ(t))→Rω,l→rμ(t′) = μ(σ(t[r]ω)) = α(t′). Moreover since μ satisﬁes σ(cIP ),
α satisﬁes cIP , so in particular of ∀Var(l′), t|ω′ = l′ for all non-variable position
ω′ ≥ ω in t. So α(t)|ω′ cannot be an instance of a left-hand side of rule in R, and
any proper subterm of s|ω is IP-irreducible. For the same reason, s|ω cannot be
reducible by a rule l′→r′ having a higher priority than l→r, since α is solution of
∀Var(l′), t|ω = l′. So the reduction step from α(t) to α(t′) is innermost and respects
priorities, and s = α(t) is IP-reducible to α(t′). 
Consequently, an IP-narrowing derivation corresponds to a set of derivations in
the abstract reduction system (T (F),→IP ).
Proposition 3.17 Let R be a rewrite system with priorities. For any term t0 ∈
T (F ,Y), and any constraint c0, if
(t0, c0)IPω1,l1→r1,σ1 (t1, c1) . . .
IP
ωn,ln→rn,σn (tn, cn)
then for any ground normalized instance of σ = σn . . . σ1, α = μσ such that μ
satisﬁes cn, we have
α(t0)→IPω1,l1→r1 . . .→IPωn,ln→rnα(tn).
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Proof By induction on the length of the IP-narrowing derivation. Lemma 3.16
provides the case n = 1. Then for any ground normalized substitution α = μσ
such that μ satisﬁes cn = σ(c0) ∧ σ(cIP1 ) ∧ σ(cIP2 ) ∧ . . . ∧ σ(cIPn ), α may also be
written α = μ′σ1 with μ′ = μσn . . . σ2. Then μ′ satisﬁes c1 = σ1(c0) ∧ σ1(cIP1 ), so
α(t0)→IPω1,l1→r1α(t1). By induction hypothesis, since α(t1) = μσn . . . σ2(t1) and μ
satisﬁes cn, α(t1)→IPω2,l2→r2 . . .→IPωn,ln→rnα(tn). 
Instantiating the initial constraint by the trivial constraint id which is always
true, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.18 Let R be a rewrite system with priorities. For any term t0 ∈
T (F ,Y), if
(t0, id)IPω1,l1→r1,σ1 (t1, c1) . . .
IP
ωn,ln→rn,σn (tn, cn)
then for any ground normalized instance of σ = σn . . . σ1, α = μσ such that μ
satisﬁes cn, we have
α(t0)→IPω1,l1→r1 . . .→IPωn,ln→rnα(tn).
Conversely the following lifting lemma is inspired from [21] and [23].
Lemma 3.19 (IP-lifting Lemma) Let R be a rewrite system with priorities. Let
s ∈ T (F ,Y), α a substitution such that α(s) is IP-reducible at a non-variable po-
sition ω of s, and V ⊆ Y a set of variables such that V ar(s) ∪ D(α) ⊆ V . If
α(s)→IPω,l→rt′, and if α satisﬁes a constraint c, whose free variables are included in
V , then there exist a term s′ ∈ T (F ,Y), a constraint c′ and normalized substitutions
μ, σ, such that:
(i) (s, c)IPω,l→r,σ (s
′, c′)
(ii) μ(s′) = t′
(iii) μσ = α[V ]
(iv) μ satisﬁes c′.
Proof We can always assume that Var(l) and V are disjoint. We have α(s)|ω = β(l)
for some β with D(β) ⊆ Var(l). Since ω is a non-variable position in s, and since
the domains of α and β are disjoint, s|ω and l are uniﬁable by α ∪ β = γ. Let σ
be an idempotent most general uniﬁer of these two terms. Let s′ = σ(s[r]|ω). Since
σ is a mgu, there exists ρ such that ρσ = α ∪ β = γ. Let V ′ = (V \D(σ)) ∪ I(σ)
and μ = ρ|V ′ . Clearly D(μ) ⊆ V ′. On the other hand, Var(s′) = Var(σ(s[r])) ⊆
Var(σ(s[l])) = Var(σ(s)) = Var(s)\D(σ)∪I(σ)| Var(s) by Lemma 3.12, so Var(s′) ⊆
V ′. Thus we get Var(s′) ∪D(μ) ⊆ V ′. Since μ = ρ[V ′], μ(s′) = ρ(s′) = ρσ(s[r]) =
ρσ(s)[ρσ(r)] = α(s)[β(r)] = t′.
Let us prove that μσ = α[V ]. Since μ = ρ[V ′] and V ′ = (V \D(σ)) ∪ I(σ), we
get by Lemma 3.13, μσ = ρσ[V ], thus μσ = α[V ].
Let us prove that μ satisﬁes the constraint c′ = σ(c)∧σ(cinn)∧σ(cprio). Since the
free variables of c, cinn, cprio are in V , the free variables of σ(c)∧σ(cinn)∧σ(cprio) are
included in V ′. Since μσ = α[V ] and α satisﬁes c on V , then μ satisﬁes σ(c). Since
α(s)→IP t′, α satisﬁes cinn∧cprio. Since μσ = α[V ], then μ satisﬁes σ(cinn)∧σ(cprio).
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Finally, due to (iii), if α is normalized, μ is also normalized by 3.14. 
This result can be extended by induction on the number of steps to rewriting
derivations:
Proposition 3.20 Let t0 be a term, ρ be a normalized substitution, V ⊆ Y be a
set of variables such that V ar(t0) ∪D(ρ) ⊆ V . If ρ(t0)→IPω1,l1→r1t′1 . . .→IPωn,ln→rnt′n,
and if ρ satisﬁes a constraint c0 whose free variables are included in V , there exist
normalized substitutions σi(i = 1, . . . , n), constraints ci(i = 1, . . . , n) and a ground
normalized substitution μ such that:
(i) (t0, c0)IPω1,l1→r1,σ1 (t1, c1) . . .
IP
ωn,ln→rn,σn (tn, cn),
(ii) μ(tn) = t′n,
(iii) ρ = μσn . . . σ1[V ],
(iv) μ satisﬁes cn.
Proof The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation. For n = 1,
it comes from Lemma 3.19. Let us assume the property for n − 1 and consider
ρ(t0)→IPω1,l1→r1t′1 . . .→IPωn,ln→rnt′n. According to Lemma 3.19, for any c0 with free
variables in V such that α satisﬁes c0, there exists (t0, c0) IPω1,l1→r1,σ1 (t1, c1),
β(t1) = t′1, βσ1 = ρ[V ] and β satisﬁes c1. Since β is normalized and satisﬁes c1, and
since t′1 = β(t1)→IPω2,l2→r2t′2 . . .→IPωn,ln→rnt′n, by induction hypothesis, there exist
normalized substitutions σi(i = 2, . . . , n), constraints ci(i = 2, . . . , n) and a ground
normalized substitution μ such that:
(i) (t1, c1)IPω2,l2→r2,σ2 (t1, c2) . . .
IP
ωn,ln→rn,σn (tn, cn),
(ii) μ(tn) = t′n,
(iii) β = μσn . . . σ2[V ′],
(iv) μ satisﬁes cn.
where V ′ contains V ar(t1) ∪ D(ρ). Since βσ1 = ρ[V ], β = μσn . . . σ2[V ′] and V \
D(σ1) ∪ I(σ1) ⊆ V ′, according to Lemma 3.13, we get ρ = βσ1 = μσn . . . σ2σ1[V ].
Instantiating the initial constraint by the trivial constraint id which is always
true, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.21 Let t0 be a term, ρ be a normalized substitution, V ⊆ Y be a set of
variables such that V ar(t0) ∪D(ρ) ⊆ V . If ρ(t0)→IPω1,l1→r1t′1 . . .→IPωn,ln→rnt′n, there
exist normalized substitutions σi(i = 1, . . . , n), constraints ci(i = 1, . . . , n) and a
ground normalized substitution μ such that:
(i) (t0, id)IPω1,l1→r1,σ1 (t1, c1) . . .
IP
ωn,ln→rn,σn (tn, cn),
(ii) μ(tn) = t′n,
(iii) ρ = μσn . . . σ1[V ],
(iv) μ satisﬁes cn.
Example 3.22 Let us assume the following rules ordered as follows (higher priority
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is the smaller label):
1. pckt(src, dst, estab) → accept
2. pckt(eth0, dst, new) → accept
3. pckt(ppp0, dst, new) → drop
4. pckt(10.1.1.1, ppp0, s) → pckt(123.123.1.1, ppp0, s)
5. pckt(10.1.1.2, ppp0, s) → pckt(123.123.1.1, ppp0, s)
Let us apply IP-narrowing to the term t = pckt(x, y, new) and the constraint iden-
tity. Since new and estab are two diﬀerent constants, rule 1 does not apply. The
substitution σ = (x = eth0 ∧ y = y′ ∧ dst = y′) is a mgu with rule 2. Here
c′ =
∧
l′→r′∈R ∀Var(l′), new = l′ ∧
∀src, dst, pckt(etho, y′, new) = pckt(src, dst, estab)
that is equivalent to true. And therefore: tIP,2,σ accept.
Rule 3 also applies with the substitution σ′ = (x = ppp0 ∧ y = y′′ ∧ dst = y′′).
Here the constraint is
c′ =
∧
l′→r′∈R ∀Var(l′), new = l′ ∧
∀z, pckt(ppp0, y′′, new) = pckt(eth0, z, new) ∧
∀z′, z′′, pckt(ppp0, y′′, new) = pckt(z′, z′′, estab)
that is equivalent to true again. And thus t IP,3,σ′ drop. IP-narrowing with rules
4 and 5 is similar.
We are now ready to apply these results on strategic rewriting and narrowing
to rewriting-based policies.
4 Narrowing-based analysis of rewriting-based policies
In our framework, policy evaluation is performed by strategic rewriting of ground
requests. Consequently, for the safe design of security policies, several properties
have been identiﬁed [14,11].
Deﬁnition 4.1 [Termination, Consistency, Decision Completeness] [11] A security
policy ℘ = (F , D,R,Q, ζ) is
• terminating if for every q ∈ Q, all derivations of source q in ζ are ﬁnite.
• consistent if for every query q ∈ Q, ζ applied to q returns at most one result:
∀q ∈ Q, the cardinality of ζq ∩D is less than or equal to 1.
• decision complete if ∀q ∈ Q, ∃d ∈ D, such that d ∈ζq.
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To deal with policy analysis, we add now the possibility to express queries:
Deﬁnition 4.2 [Queries] Given a security policy ℘ = (F , D,R,Q, ζ), a query is a
term of T (F ,Y) where Y is a set of query variables distinct from X . A constrained
query is a pair of a term of T (F ,Y) and a ﬁrst-order equational constraint.
Based on the previous results of Section 3, we can now analyze the behavior
of security policies by solving queries. The method relies on the construction of a
narrowing tree for a given query: all possible (strategic) narrowing steps are ap-
plied to this term and recursively to the resulting ones, yielding a possibly inﬁnite
tree. The general intuitive idea is that the narrowing trees provide a good sim-
ulation of the rewriting derivation trees that correspond to requests evaluation of
the policy. We make the assumption that the security policy is terminating, in or-
der to consider normalized terms, substitutions and instantiations. There are quite
powerful techniques to check termination such as recursive path orderings [13], se-
mantic labeling [37], dependency pairs [3], etc. These and other techniques have
been implemented by several tools that allow to verify termination for a large sets
of rewrite systems: for example AProVE [20], TTT [25], and CiME [32], to cite a
few. All these veriﬁcation methods and tools check termination statically, which is
very attractive for the speciﬁcation of ﬂexible policies.
Considering innermost termination in particular, speciﬁc methods have been
given for instance in [2,19,23]. Techniques have also been studied for termination
of outermost rewriting [23], for termination of lazy rewriting [18] or for termination
of priority rewriting [35,21]. Moreover it is often possible to prove termination in
general (i.e. for the universal strategy), which implies termination under any
strategy.
Example 4.3 The policy from Example 2.2 is not decision complete: the request
pckt(123.123.1.1, ppp0, new) is not reducible in this system and thus cannot be eval-
uated into a decision. If we add to the system the rule
pckt(123.123.1.1, ppp0, new) → accept,
the policy becomes decision complete. In this example, a careful exhaustive explo-
ration of all expressible requests and their reduction is possible. However in general,
there is no method yet to prove this property formally for IP-rewriting. A promising
approach may be found in [17] or [22].
The termination property can be easily checked by analyzing the rules of the
policy and giving a simpliﬁcation ordering > such that l > r for any left- and right-
hand sides l, r of rules in R. This guarantees that the evaluation of any request will
always terminate on a resulting term.
Consistency is also easily checked on this example since the critical pairs between
rule 1 and rules 4 and 5 are convergent. However, note that conﬂuence of IP-
rewriting is not needed in the following, but would also require further study.
Thanks to the theoretical results of Section 3 stated both for rewriting and IP-
rewriting, the narrowing-based analysis can be performed for IP-rewriting strategies
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as well as for universal ones. More generally, whenever simulation of strategic
rewriting by strategic narrowing can be established, the approach developed below
for policy analysis can be followed. In order to cover IP and universal strategies,
we consider in the following a narrowing relation on constrained terms, denoted by
 for simplicity.
4.1 Reachability analysis
Narrowing has been studied in [33] to solve reachability problems in cryptographic
protocols veriﬁcation. The problem is to ﬁnd all solutions of a reachability goal
s→∗t, i.e. substitutions σ such that σ(s)→∗σ(t) with the rewrite system R which
is terminating but possibly non-conﬂuent. Narrowing is complete w.r.t. normalized
substitutions: for every normalized substitution ρ, a more general solution η can be
found by narrowing. The interested reader can refer to [33] to ﬁnd other complete-
ness results for solving reachability goals in particular classes of rewrite systems or
of goals. These results can be useful for policy analysis and bear some similarities
with the results we present below in the context of policy analysis.
4.2 What-if analysis
Let us ﬁrst consider queries of the form q(x1, . . . , xn) where q is a term in T (F ,Y)
with variables x1, . . . , xn ∈ Y.
For a constrained term (u, c), we denote by 〈u, c〉 the set {θ(u) | θ ∈ Φ, θ ∈
Sol(c)} where Φ is the set of all ground normalized instances of T (F ,Y) into T (F)
and Sol(c) the set of ground normalized solutions of the constraint c.
Proposition 4.4 Let us consider the narrowing tree of the constrained query (q, id).
(i) For every node (u, c) such that (q, id)∗σ (u, c), all requests 〈σ(q), c〉 evaluate
to ground instances of u in 〈u, c〉, where σ is the composition of normalized
narrowing substitutions used in the narrowing derivation.
(ii) For any request t reachable by the policy from a request α(q), where α is nor-
malized, there exists a node (u, c) in the narrowing tree of (q, id), such that
(q, id)∗σ (u, c) and t = μ(u), with μ normalized and μ satiﬁes c.
Proof
(i) is a direct application of Proposition 3.9 and Corollary 3.18.
(ii) directly follows from Proposition 3.11 and Corollary 3.21.

Based on this result, we can make some what-if analysis, as shown on the simple
ﬁrewall Example 2.2.
Example 4.5 Suppose we want to know which packets get accepted for a new
connection. This amounts to solve the query pckt(x, y, new). We get the following
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narrowing substitutions with the respective rules:
(1) x = eth0 y = dst
(2) x = ppp0 y = dst
(3) x = 10.1.1.1 y = ppp0 new = s
(4) x = 10.1.1.2 y = ppp0 new = s
(5) x = 123.123.1.1 y = ppp0
giving respectively accept, drop and pckt(123.123.1.1, ppp0, new) twice, which can
be reduced (i.e. narrowed with the identity substitution) to accept. These terms
are no more narrowable. So possible requests that give an accept decision are
- ground instances of pckt(eth0, dst, new)
- and the requests
pckt(123.123.1.1, ppp0, new), pckt(10.1.1.1, ppp0, new), pckt(10.1.1.2, ppp0, new).
4.3 Analyzing decisions
Another interest of the approach is to provide also a methodology for analyzing the
decisions taken by the policy. Let us ﬁrst state some terminology and deﬁnitions.
In this whole section, we assume that the policy ℘ is terminating and decisison
complete.
A decision term is a ground term of D in normal form. A query pattern is a
term p with variables x1, . . . , xn ∈ Y, that we will write p(x1, . . . , xn) when we want
the variables to be explicit.
Let us assume from now on that the set Q of requests is deﬁned as the set of
ground instances of a ﬁnite set of query patterns. They are supposed non uniﬁable,
so that in this way, every request is an instance of one query pattern.
The idea is that the narrowing trees built from this ﬁnite set of query patterns
provide a correct and complete schematization of the request evaluation: correct
means that every narrowing derivation represents a set of requests evaluations; com-
plete means that every request evaluation is an instance of a narrowing derivation
in the narrowing tree of its query pattern.
Then we can state the following results.
Proposition 4.6 (Correctness) For a given security policy ℘ with query patterns,
let us consider the narrowing trees of the constrained query patterns (p, id).
If (p, id)∗σ (u, c), u is a decision term and c is satisﬁable, where σ is the composi-
tion of normalized narrowing substitutions, then the set 〈σ(p), c〉 is a set of requests
leading to the decision u.
Proof This is a consequence of Proposition 4.4(i). Since u is a decision term, it is
ground, so 〈u, c〉 = {u} provided c is satisﬁable. 
Proposition 4.7 (Completeness) For a given security policy ℘ with query patterns,
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for any request q which is a ground normalized instance α of the query pattern p,
there exists a narrowing derivation (p, id)∗σ (u, c) with c satisﬁable, such that the
evaluation of q = α(p) gives an instance of u in 〈u, c〉.
Proof This is a consequence of Proposition 4.4(ii). 
Provided decisions are normalized terms (which is trivial when decisions are
constants on which no rewrite rule applies), for a security policy ℘ with query
patterns, in order to generate all possible requests leading to a given decision, we
can collect all the narrowing branches leading to this decision (obviously a leaf
since a decision is no more reducible nor narrowable) and consider the union of the
composed substitutions along each branch.
Proposition 4.8 For a given security policy ℘ with m query patterns, let us con-
sider the narrowing trees of the constrained query patterns (pi, id) for i = 1, ...,m.
Let d be a decision that appears in one or more narrowing trees of the constrained
query patterns, say (p1, id)∗σ1 (d, c1),..., (pk, id)
∗
σk
(d, ck) where σ1,...,σk are the
composed (constrained) substitutions. Then the set of ground normalized requests
that evaluate to this decision d is 〈σ1(p1), c1〉 ∪ . . . ∪ 〈σk(pk), ck〉.
Proof By correctness, every set 〈σi(pi), ci〉 is a set of requests leading to d. Con-
versely, any request is a ground normalized instance of a pattern, and by complete-
ness, there exists a narrowing derivation leading to d. 
One can also prove that a given pattern is not reachable, by trying to unify
this pattern with each node. If no node uniﬁes with the pattern, the latter is
unreachable. In our framework, this gives the following result:
Proposition 4.9 If a decision d is not an instance of any term u in a node (u, c)
in the narrowing trees, then d is not reachable.
Proof Assume that there exists a request leading to d. Then it would be a ground
normalized instance of some pattern p and there would exist a rewriting derivation
α(p) ∗−→ d, with α ground normalized, and then a node (u, c) such that (p, id)∗σ
(u, c) and d = μ(u), which contradicts the hypothesis. 
Let us come back to Example 2.2.
Example 4.10 Suppose we want to know which packets get accepted and which
are dropped. This amounts to solve the query pckt(x, y, z). We get the following
narrowing substitutions with the respective rules:
(1) x = src y = dst z = estab
(2) x = eth0 y = dst z = new
(3) x = ppp0 y = dst z = new
(4) x = 10.1.1.1 y = ppp0 z = s
(5) x = 10.1.1.2 y = ppp0 z = s
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Narrowing with the two ﬁrst rules transforms the query pckt(x, y, z) into accept,
while the third rule transforms the query into drop. Narrowing with the two last
rules transforms the query pckt(x, y, z) into pckt(123.123.1.1, ppp0, s). Then in each
case a narrowing step can be again applied with the ﬁrst rule, getting accept with
z = estab. The two composed substitutions are (6)(x = 10.1.1.1, y = ppp0, z =
estab) and (7)(x = 10.1.1.2, y = ppp0, z = estab).
There is then one more branch in the narrowing tree leading to accept with
the substitution (8)(x = 123.123.1.1, y = ppp0, z = new). A complete set of queries
leading to the decision accept is given by the set of substitutions {(1), (2), (6), (7), (8)}.
5 Conclusion
The general context of this research is the design of a foundational framework for
the compositional design, maintenance and veriﬁcation of security policies. The
framework initially presented in [14,12] addresses the problem of authoring and
analyzing access control policies in a modular way using techniques developed in the
ﬁeld of strategic rewriting. Rewrite rules transform input terms representing access
requests into access decision terms. In order to tame the raw computational power
of term rewriting and to enhance the agility of the policy speciﬁcation language,
strategies are used to explicitly control the rule application. In this approach, the
correspondences between the properties of the rewrite system and the policy it
implements are easy to understand, thus we are able to directly apply a rich corpus
of existing proof techniques and tools. We have proposed here to use narrowing
to contribute to improve the trust of a user or an administrator with respect to a
policy, not only at the design stage, but also whenever a policy is updated. However,
adapting new concepts such as strategic rewriting or strategic narrowing is yet
an ongoing goal which this paper begins to contributes to. Future work concerns
ﬁne-tuned analysis tools for policies, especially to formalize and tackle the various
strategies used by developers of policies.
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